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T
HE small size of farms is a persistent phenomenon in the organisation of
agriculture in developed countries. Prevailing farm size has most often been
contemplated as suboptimal and in connection with inefficient use of resources in
agriculture. In fact, many farms are too small even to fully employ the available fam-
ily labour, forcing a part-time strategy to achieve sustainable income levels. But the
efficiency issue has to be contemplated in a wider setting, taking into account that
farm demands on farm households’ resources are frequently competing with de-
mands from off-farm activities (Schmitt, 1991).
Family labour is usually the most important cost item for small farms. Without
taking transaction costs into account, the farmer will allocate optimally his own
and his family’s labour when marginal labour product equals the wage rate that
represents opportunity costs of farm labour. But it is not clear which wage rate
should be considered representative of labour opportunity costs. Agricultural
household literature provides an analytical framework to treat family’s labour
shadow price (see Singh et al. (1986) for a good formal introduction). This litera-
ture has pointed out that the household’s utility could depend not merely on the
household’s total labour supply but on its allocation between on-farm and off-farm
employment. This would be the case if farmers have a clear preference for self-
employment as opposed to a wage-earning activity. Also, transactions costs and the
need to supervise hired labourers can prevent household labour and hired labour
being perfect substitutes in production. The shadow price of on-farm household
work could therefore be exogenously determined only under unrealistic assump-
tions, as equal either to the off-farm rate or to the hired labour wage rate (López,
1986). Consequently, in many cases an endogenous shadow wage rate must be
computed, according to farm production technology, output and input prices.
Understanding the existence of an endogenous wage for the household’s labour
permits a better assessment of the consequences of policy interventions aimed at
increasing farm output prices, particularly in the case of developing countries. If
output prices increase, for example, the shadow price of on-farm labour will also
increase, altering the farm household’s decisions on consumption and labour sup-
ply allocations (López, 1984). The neo-classical farm-household model has also
been used to assess the impact of farm policy reform – e.g., the 1992 Common
Agricultural Policy reform – on farmers’ behaviour in industrialized countries,
through the changes induced in its reservation wage by the use of the new policy
instruments (Benjamin, 1996).
The endogenous shadow wage represents the opportunity cost of time for
self-employed farmers and is determined from within the household. The house-
hold’s capital assets – particularly size and quality of farmland and endowment of
skilled and unskilled labour – can be used as predictors of this shadow wage. Farm
households will develop different labour market participation strategies, according
to their asset position and to the relationship between hired wage rate, off-farm
market wage rate and shadow wage, which in turn is largely influenced by trans-A. J. PICAZO-TADEO, E. REIG-MARTÍNEZ
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actions costs in labour markets. Some households will be selling labour services,
others hiring salaried workers, others being self-sufficient with labour resources of
their own, and finally some will be operating with a combination of hired labour
and family on-farm labour (Sadoulet et al., 1998). Proportional transaction costs –
such as costs of accessing markets owing to transportation and imperfect informa-
tion – and fixed ones – such as costs of screening and supervision of hired labour
– can both heavily influence the household’s decision to enter or leave factor and
product markets and – as has been empirically demonstrated – aggregate supply
elasticities (Key et al., 2000).
Consequently, computation of the farm-level labour shadow price acquires great
importance for understanding the determinants of household labour supply, and
also to analyse the rationality of different market participation strategies within a
given farming system. Computed household shadow wage rates have also been
compared with off-farm wage rates and hired farm labour wages, to test the inter-
dependence between the household’s utility and profit-maximizing decisions,
under the assumption that rejecting the equality of virtual, or implicit, wages and
exogenous market wages would amount to a rejection of separability between
farmers’ consumption and production decisions (Sadoulet, 2001). Pricing the time
employed by household members in running the farm is also of interest in order to
ascertain the profitability of farm’s fixed assets and the way it changes with farm
size or other relevant variables.
Most of the attempts to estimate farmers’ own labour shadow wages have used
a production function approach to obtain the marginal product of labour. Jacoby
(1993) calculated the marginal productivity of adult male and female farm labour
for each household, using a sample of households in the Peruvian highlands. Then,
household labour supply parameters were recovered from variation in these shadow
prices. Skoufias (1994) estimated shadow wages and shadow income using panel
data on household inputs and outputs from six villages in India. The estimated
shadow wages and income were then matched with individual time allocation data
and household-specific characteristics. His results rejected the equality of marginal
products and the observed wages, lending support to the hypothesis of non-sepa-
rability between production and consumption decisions of farm households. Some
potential explanations were advanced: employment constraints in the rural labour
market and/or commuting costs associated with wage work.
Elhorst (1994) modeled the production side of an agricultural household model
by using a quadratic functional form for the profit function and making use of
Hotelling’s lemma to study output supply and variable input demand. The
empirical analysis was based on cross-section data for Dutch dairy farms, with
observations belonging both to the milk pre-quota and post-quota period. The
marginal product of on-farm labour was defined as the amount of money by which
farm profit would rise if on-farm labour input rose by an hour. It was concluded
that this on-farm labour shadow wage was substantially smaller than the market
wage rate. But it was also ascertained that farm profit elasticities calculated from
a single production model and a relatively complex agricultural household modelSHADOW WAGES OF FAMILY LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE
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were similar, so the results were inconclusive concerning the usefulness of coupling
or not coupling the consumption and production parts of the model.
The discrepancy between shadow and market wages has been used to give empir-
ical content to farmers’ specific preferences for working on-farm. Using data from
two French surveys, it has been found that implicit on-farm wages are below off-
farm wages for both males and females in farm households (Fall and Magnac, 2004).
These authors also estimate medians of lower bounds for preference parameters, pro-
viding evidence of a significant taste for working on-farm. They suggest that ob-
served specific tastes can be explained in a dynamic setting if both wages were closer
at the beginning of farmers’ professional careers and sunk-cost investments in
human capital at this time became irreversible afterwards, as wages drifted away.
Within this theoretical framework, in this paper we compute shadow prices for
family labour in Spanish citrus fruit farms. The goal of the paper is twofold. First,
we wish to compare shadow prices for family labour with the market wages that
are paid to contracted labour teams. Additionally, we show the usefulness of a
method of computing individual farms’ shadow wages, based on duality microe-
conomics and mathematical programming, which can be employed when sample
size precludes the use of econometric techniques. Our hypothesis is that market
wages should display a positive differential, arising from higher efficiency in
labour use and also reflecting superior skills in performing specialized tasks on the
part of external workers. The empirical results we obtain seem to confirm this
view, as they show that farm market wages are higher than computed shadow
wages. If that is the case, some relevant questions can be asked of policy-makers.
Instead of wasting time in vain attempts to make citrus production structures con-
form to the family farm model, by pursuing an increase in the average size of
farms, more attention should be paid to the efficiency of those service firms that
are effectively in charge of performing basic cultivation tasks.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we briefly explain
basic aspects of the methodology. The data are then described, and the results dis-
cussed. Finally, we conclude.
Methodology: Input distance functions and shadow prices
In order to briefly describe the main insights of the methodology, let us con-
sider a productive process that uses a vector of inputs x to produce a vector of out-
puts y. The technology of reference is given by the input requirement set L(y)
that represents all input vectors that produce at least an output vector y. It is
assumed that the technology satisfies the standard axioms initially proposed by
Shephard (1970) (see also Grosskopf, 1986). These properties include the possibil-
ity of inaction, no free lunch, free disposability of inputs and strong disposability
of outputs.
The input distance function measures the maximum attainable radial con-
traction of a given vector of inputs such that the resulting input vector remainsA. J. PICAZO-TADEO, E. REIG-MARTÍNEZ
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within the input requirement set L(y). This function is equivalent to the recipro-
cal of the input-oriented efficiency measure of Farrell (Farrell, 1957; Färe and
Lovell, 1978) and is formally defined by Shephard (1970) as:
DI(y,x) = Sup [µ : (x/µ) ∈ L(y)], (1)
where µ ≥ 1, given that x ∈ L(y) if and only if DI(y,x) ≥ 1.
Making use of the duality theory, under certain assumptions the input distance
function can be used to derive input shadow prices. There exists a duality between
the cost function and the input distance function, such that the former can be
expressed as:
C(y,p) = Minx [px : DI (y,x) ≥ 1], (2)
px being the inner product of input prices and quantities vectors.
The dual input distance function is given by:
DI (y,x) = Minρ [ρx : C(y,ρ) ≥ 1], (3)
where ρ are cost-normalized prices (see Färe and Grosskopf, 1990).
Assuming that the cost and input distance functions are both differentiable and
making use of Shephard’s dual lemma (see Jacobsen, 1972), the ratio between
the shadow prices of inputs i and j can be computed as the quotient between the
partial derivatives of the input distance function with respect to those inputs (for
details see Färe and Primont, 1995, pp. 54-59):
pi ∂DI (y,x)/∂xi —– = —————— (4)
pj ∂DI (y,x)/∂xj
Under the assumption that there is at least one input optimally allocated, i.e.,
the observed price of market input j equals its shadow price pj, the shadow price
of input i can be computed from expression (4) as follows:
∂Dl (y,x)/∂xi pi = pj —————— (5)
∂DI (y,x)/∂xj
Finally, in order to obtain shadow prices the input distance function needs to
be parameterized and estimated by econometric methods or computed using goal
programming techniques.
Other studies have computed shadow prices making use of similar methodolo-
gies. Färe et al. (1993) pioneered this line of research using an output distance func-
tion approach to calculate shadow prices for undesirable outputs generated by thirty
paper and pulp mills operating in Michigan and Wisconsin. Coggins and Swinton
(1996) computed shadow prices for sulfur dioxide emissions of coal-burning electric
plants in Wisconsin. Piot-Lepetit and Vermersch (1998) use the duality between the
cost and distance functions to derive a shadow price for inorganic nitrogen produced
as a by-product of animal breeding for a sample of French pig farms. Hailu and
Veeman (2000) have also performed this type of analysis, dealing with the calcula-
tion of shadow prices of undesirable outputs for the Canadian pulp and paper in-1 Encuesta sobre Utilización de Medios de Producción en la Explotación Agraria
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dustry. Reig-Martínez et al. (2001) also estimated an output distance function to cal-
culate the shadow price of bads generated in the Spanish ceramic tile industry.
These shadow prices were used to construct an environmentally adjusted index of
productivity, which was then compared with conventional productivity indices.
Finally, in a recent paper, Lee et al. (2002) estimate the shadow prices of pollutants
through a nonparametric directional distance function approach, including in their
analysis the inefficiency involved in the production processes.
The data
The dataset used in this paper has been built from the comprehensive Survey on
Input Use by Farms1 gathered in 1997 by the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture,
Fishery and Food. The data are restricted to citrus fruit farms operating in the
Region of Valencia, which is the main producing and exporting area of the
Mediterranean Basin, accounting for over 70 per cent of Spanish citrus fruit pro-
duction. The Regional Government Board of Agriculture has made the original
individual poll forms available to the authors. After eliminating multi-crop farms,
observations with missing data and, finally, citrus farms that were not in full pro-
duction, e.g. new-tree plantations, our set of data reached a size of twenty one sin-
gle crop full production citrus farms.
Output is measured in kilograms of citrus fruit production. The only fixed
input is cultivated land (hectares). Variable inputs are: own and hired labour (both
measured in annual worker units or AWU), capital (annual hours of use of agri-
cultural machinery), consumption of nitrogen (in kilograms) and, finally pesticides
expenditure (in euros). Own labour input sums up the farmer’s and his family’s on-
farm labour, while capital includes hours of use of own and hired machinery and
equipment. In relation to the use of chemical products, different commercial fer-
tilizers are in use, with chemical formulae that mix nutrients in different propor-
tions. Agronomic experts from the Valencian Regional Agricultural Board assisted
us in translating commercial fertiliser weights into basic nitrogen units. Finally,
lack of information on physical quantities led us to measure pesticide input in
monetary units. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of the data.
Table 1. Sample description
Variable Description Units Mean Standard deviation
y  Citrus fruit production Kg 92,594 98,787
x1 Land Ha 6.54 11.25
x2 Own-family labour AWU 0.77 10.49
x3 Wage-earning labour AWU 0.53 10.62
x4 Capital Hours of use of machinery 634 1,015
x5 Nitrogen Kg 2,419 4,949
x6 Pesticides Euro 4,417 9,9862 From a theoretical point of view, there are several potential solutions to this problem.
Probably the most obvious would be to estimate by econometric methods a function with
fewer parameters, e.g. a Cobb-Douglas production function (see Jacoby, 1993), instead of main-
taining an input distance approach based on a parameter-rich translog functional form.
Secondly, maintaining the input distance approach as well as the translog functional form,
bootstrapping procedures could be performed to compute confidence intervals for calculated
shadow wages (Efron, 1979; also see Ziari and Azzam, 1999). In our empirical application all
of these solutions failed to obtain meaningful results due to the characteristics of our sample.
Particularly, a sample size of only 21 observations, in addition to the low observed variability
of some of our exogenous variables, precludes accurately estimating, i.e., with smaller variance,
the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas production function.
3 This is a very common problem in the literature which, however, does not in general
invalidate the results of studies that have calculated shadow prices with small samples using a
distance function approach and goal programming methods. This is the case of the pioneering
paper by Färe et al. (1993), which analysed a sample of 30 paper and pulp mills. Other refer-
ences are: Coggins and Swinton (1996) – 14 coal-burning electric plants with panel data for
1990-92; Hailu and Veeman (2000) – 36 industry aggregate time series data for the period
1959-94; and also Reig et al. (2001) – 18 Spanish ceramic firms.
A. J. PICAZO-TADEO, E. REIG-MARTÍNEZ
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Empirical specification and results
In our empirical specification, we have parameterized the input distance
function as a translog function. This functional form was initially proposed by
Christensen et al. (1973) and has the desirable property of being a flexible function
that can be easily computed, allowing the imposition of theoretical restrictions.
Formally, the translog input distance function is defined as:
This input distance function can either be econometrically estimated if suffi-
cient data are available, or calculated making use of mathematical programming
methods when the sample size is small. The mathematical programming approach
to computation of distance functions constitutes a flexible method that allows
restrictions of equality and also of inequality to be imposed very easily (see Aigner
and Chu, 1968). However, the main shortcoming of this technique is that it does
not provide measures of goodness of fit, preventing the testing of hypotheses.
Unfortunately, our sample size renders the econometric approach infeasible and,
therefore, the distance function has been calculated by goal programming tech-
niques2. The main implication of this restriction is that the statistical robustness
of the difference between computed shadow family labour wages and observed


















DI(y, x)4 The program has been written and solved using GAMS software.
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In essence, the aim of our mathematical programming is to minimize the sum
of the deviations from zero of the log of the distance function. Particularly, the
parameters on which expression (6) depends have been computed as the solution of
the following optimization program4:
21
Min(φ,β,α,γ) ln DI (yk,xk) (7)
k=1
subject to:
ln DI (yk,xk) ≥ 0 k = 1,...,21 (i)
∂ln DI (yk,xk)
















β nn′ = β n′n n = 1,..., 6;     n′ = 1,..., 6 (v)
where k denotes farms, n denotes inputs and m output.
The set of restrictions in (i) guarantees that the estimated distance function
identifies input-output observations as feasible, i.e., each observation is located
within the technology of reference. The restrictions contained in (ii) ensure the
input distance function to be non-decreasing in inputs, while constraints in (iii)
are needed for the distance to be a non-increasing function of output. Finally,
restrictions in (iv) ensure the linear homogeneity in inputs of the distance func-
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Our sample size and the characterization of the input-output relationship of cit-
rus fruit farms determined a minimization problem subject to 191 restrictions. In
particular, there are 21 restrictions relative to the feasibility constraint, 147 mono-
tonicity restrictions (126 related to inputs and the remaining 21 associated with
output), 8 conditions of linear homogeneity and, finally, 15 symmetry constraints,
all of them related to inputs. Table 2 shows the calculated parameters of the trans-
log input distance function.
Table 2. Translog input distance function parameter estimates
Parameters Parameters
φ -12.814 β26 0.000
β1 -0.466 β33 -0.049
β2 -0.286 β34 0.000
β3 -0.800 β35 0.096
β4 0.000 β36 0.000
β5 2.552 β44 0.000
β6 0.000 β45 0.000
α1 1.225 β46 0.000
β11 0.026 β55 -0.022
β12 0.060 β56 0.000
β13 -0.059 β66 0.000
β14 0.000 α11 -0.036
β15 -0.027 γ11 0.095
β16 0.000 γ21 0.055
β22 -0.024 γ31 0.025
β23 0.012 γ41 0.000
β24 0.000 γ51 -0.176
β25 -0.047 γ61 0.000
Individual farms’ input distances have been computed using these parameters.
On average, input distance takes a value equal to 1.631. It is well known that the
input distance function is the inverse of Farrell’s inputs technical efficiency index,
whose average value is 0.613. In other words, this means that – given the restric-
tions imposed by technology – by making an efficient use of their resources the
farms in the sample would be able to maintain their production using only 61 per
cent of the inputs they actually use.
There are six fully efficient farms, i.e., those with an input distance equal to
one. The high levels of inefficiency computed should not come as a surprise, since
they agree with the results obtained by other studies of Spanish citrus fruit agri-
culture (Picazo-Tadeo and Reig-Martínez, 2002; also see Reig-Martínez and
Picazo-Tadeo, 2004).5 The formula used to obtain shadow prices should be evaluated at the technically efficient
frontier of the technology of reference, since cost minimisation requires the firm to be techni-
cally and allocatively efficient. Nevertheless, in practice there are no differences between the
shadow prices computed at the actual observation and the shadow prices calculated at its tech-
nically efficient radial projection. The reason for this is that, due to the linear homogeneity in
inputs of the input distance function, the ratio of input derivatives in expressions (4) and (5)
is homogeneous of degree zero in inputs.
6 Drawing the inputs requirement set so that own family labour is on the vertical axis, a
zero shadow price points to a farm operating on the horizontal segment of the isoquant, where
the marginal rate of substitution between wage-earning labour and own labour equals zero. In
these circumstances, the right hand side of expression (5) equals zero and so does the shadow
price of own-family labour.
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In order to calculate the shadow wage of family labour, we have used expression
(5) on the assumption that the observed market price of hired labour equals its abso-
lute shadow price5. The market price of hired – or wage-earning – labour has been
computed dividing monetary expenditure by salaried AWU. Table 3 shows the com-
putations for shadow prices as well as wage-earning labour observed prices. Sample
means, medians and standard deviations are also reported. On average, the comput-
ed shadow price for family labour equals 5,212 euros per AWU. Likewise, we find
that own labour shadow wages estimates differ significantly among farms, as the
high standard deviation reveals. This result has also been observed in other studies,
which have found important differences among individual firms’ shadow prices for
inputs or undesirable outputs (see Färe et al., 1993). Here, shadow wages are positive
for seventeen farms, while for the remaining four they take a value equal to zero6.
The presence of zero shadow prices makes medians preferable to averages for com-
paring market wages to shadow wages. In this case, the median of the distribution of
shadow wages of own-family labour is equal to 1,844 euros per AWU, a figure con-
siderably lower than the median of the market wages distribution (7,572 euros).
Table 3. Own labour shadow prices (euros per AWU)
Market observed price of Shadow price of 




Standard deviation 1,970 6,694
Maximum 12,186 22,886
Minimum 3,720 0
Concerning the economic interpretation of these results, differences between
family labour shadow wages and the market wage can arise from a wide range of
circumstances, as has been indicated in the introduction. Farmers may have a pref-
erence for working on their own farm rather than in off-farm jobs, or they may
simply implicitly calculate transport costs and other expenditures associated with
off-farm jobs. Institutional restrictions – like minimum working hours – may also
limit the range of choice of working time off-farm. Another possible explanation
would be an imperfect substitutability between hired labour and family labour.A. J. PICAZO-TADEO, E. REIG-MARTÍNEZ
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We believe that, besides farmers’ preferences for working on their own farm,
some special features of the regional citrus fruit labour market lend support to the
hypothesis of imperfect labour substitutability. Spanish citrus farms are very rep-
resentative of the type of small sized productive units operating in a regional eco-
nomic environment where there are plenty of opportunities for part-time farmers
using their labour in off-farm activities – whether as wage-earners in the farming
sector or in services or industrial activities. The prevailing source of off-farm
income varies according to the economic status of the farmer. Relatively well-off
farmers get income from industry or services employment. With a farm size of
less than four hectares, farmers usually get wages from the agricultural labour
market, while with less than one hectare farmers obtain most of their income as
salary (Arnalte et al., 1990). This agricultural labour market does not apparently
present any rigidities – minimum quantities or fixed time schedules – that could
hinder off-farm labour supply.
Part-time farming can be accommodated with the employment of wage
labourers on the farm when there is a gap between agricultural and non-agricul-
tural wages. This is a clear theoretical possibility (Gorgoni, 1980; Sadoulet et al.,
1998) and also an empirical observation in Spanish citrus farming (Arnalte,
1980; Arnalte and Estruch, 2000). A strategy of externalisation – or outsourc-
ing – of many growing tasks (phytosanitary treatments, pruning or fertilisation,
among others) has been adopted by citrus farmers in Spain as a way of overcom-
ing the negative effect on costs of the small size of most farms and, at the same
time, freeing them to secure a more profitable use of their labour time.
Specialized tasks are contracted with services firms or local labour teams,
equipped with their own implements or machinery. Harvesting operations are
also executed by trading firms or by cooperatives that contract and manage the
required labour force. As a consequence, the scale of productive processes is no
longer constrained by the dimension of individual farms, and the fragmented
structure of agricultural holdings ceases to be an insurmountable barrier to eco-
nomic rationalization. The farmer’s economic profile also changes accordingly and
he becomes a manager, mainly involved with key decisions on choosing product
varieties and buyers, and progressively less acquainted with farming techniques.
As an illustrative figure, less than 7 per cent of citrus farmers devote more than
50 per cent of their working day to their own farm (Arnalte and Estruch, 2001)
and most of the small citrus landowners earn wage income from employment in
the regional agricultural labour market or, increasingly, in services or industry.
All these characteristics make it difficult to classify Spanish citrus farming within
the family farm class.
In the fifties and sixties, outsourcing was first used as a way of farm man-
agement by urban middle class professionals, who had invested their savings in
citrus orchards and had neither the time nor the expertise to become directly
involved in farming, but it expanded later to become a widely dominant system
nowadays. Even very small farms are fully externalized – wage labour is widely
used by farms that hardly exceed 1 hectare. Our hypothesis is that outsourcing
may be one of the reasons for the difference between market wages and shadow7 In our sample, the average market wage paid per hour of hired labour amounted to 10.74
euros. According to the figures of the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE), this salary is
very close to the earnings reached in 1997 – when the Survey on Input Use by Farms that we use was
carried out – by skilled workers in other economic activities, i.e., 9.56 euros per hour in the build-
ing industry, 11.69 euros per hour in manufacturing activities and 9.83 euros per hour in the ser-
vice sector. In all these economic activities salaries of unskilled workers were significantly lower,
i.e., 6.75, 6.35 and 6.10 euros per hour in construction, manufactures and services, respectively.
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wages. We guess that service firms enjoy some kind of competitive advantage
because labour is more efficiently managed and specialization skills can be more
easily acquired and profitably used. Very plausibly, these workers are more skilled
and efficient than family workers in performing some specific tasks and this
would give support to the positive differential displayed by market wages in rela-
tion to computed family labour shadow prices. In fact, the market wages of such
labour teams are close to those of skilled workers in other activities and are clearly
higher than earnings of unskilled workers7.
In our view, this finding could have important economic policy implications,
as we outlined in the introduction. Instead of trying to make Spanish citrus pro-
duction structures conform to a family farm model, policy-makers should focus
their efforts on improving the efficiency of service firms that are effectively per-
forming basic cultivation tasks. Policy measures should be taken to improve their
labour force’s technical skills, and to make the latest technological innovations
more easily accessible to them, having always in mind that it is mainly these
firms, not the farmers directly, that really adopt new technologies.
Finally, we would like to highlight that in our results we also find a high
shadow wage rate associated to a low use of family labour input. This circum-
stance may be consistent with off-farm labour opportunities outside farming,
whether in the liberal professions, in services, or in manufacturing industries. It
could be clearly the case for farmers – or their relatives – who have achieved high
educational levels. Unfortunately, lack of additional information on the educa-
tional and professional training achievements of both family and external work-
ers, as well as other characteristics, prevents us performing more complete analy-
ses. Likewise, the small size of our sample precludes further analyses to test the
statistical significance of our findings. Nevertheless, we really believe that our
shadow wages computation contributes to a better understanding of Spanish cit-
rus farms’ labour allocation decisions between on-farm and off-farm employment.
Obviously, further research prolonging our results is needed as larger samples and
more detailed data may become available.
Concluding remarks
Farm-household models have emphasized the interdependence between house-
hold’s utility and profit-maximizing decisions, and have stressed the assumption
of endogenous determination of the household’s labour shadow wage as a keyA. J. PICAZO-TADEO, E. REIG-MARTÍNEZ
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issue for an understanding of his different labour strategies. In this paper we have
estimated shadow wages for family labour in Spanish citrus farms making use of
an input distance function approach and goal programming methods. Accord-
ingly, central importance has been given to the duality between input distance
and cost functions, using the former to derive input shadow prices.
The results we obtain show that own labour shadow prices for individual farms
are, in general, smaller than the observed citrus labour market wage rate. Other
coincidental results, concerning the relationship between opportunity cost of fam-
ily labour on the farm and the off-farm market wage rate, have been reported in
the literature, with a wide range of possible explanations, among them transaction
costs, non-substitutability between family labour and hired labour and a preference
for labour on-farm.
Our hypothesis is that the strategy of externalization of many growing tasks,
which has been pursued for a long time by Spanish citrus fruit producers, gives
some support to the idea of non-substitutability between family labour and hired
labour. We hypothesize that hired labour is more skilled than most of the family
labour that the farmer can command, and this would explain the positive differen-
tial displayed by market wages in relation to computed family labour shadow
prices. In our view, this would lead to some relevant economic policy questions.
Long-range regional agricultural policies that try to increase the average size of cit-
rus farms to make them conform to an abstract family farm model may be not
only unfruitful but also misguided. More attention should be directed to improv-
ing the efficiency and technical skills of the service firms, cooperatives and small-
specialized labour teams, as potential adopters of technical innovations with a
likely impact on labour productivity and competitiveness.SHADOW WAGES OF FAMILY LABOUR IN AGRICULTURE
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